Why Does Taiwan Matter to Europe? Examining British, French and German Perspectives on Nancy Pelosi’s Visit to Taiwan in 2022

Research and Publication Grant Awardee 2024

The night of 3 August 2022 was extraordinary for Taiwan. I was hanging out with friends in a stir-fry restaurant in Taipei while the world worried that Chinese missiles could soon fly over our heads. Nancy Pelosi, then speaker of the US House of Representatives, landed in Taipei that night, triggering unprecedented military exercises from Beijing. The surreal experience of living through the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis inspired me to study the event as my doctoral project. This related side project, which is kindly funded by the EATS Research and Publication Grant, looks at how the Europeans perceived Pelosi’s visit. Thanks to the support of EATS, this side project was completed and presented at the University of Nottingham and the University of Zurich 2024 Joint Conference “Changing Dynamics in Geopolitics: Implications for Taiwan.” This article presents parts of the project’s findings.

INTRODUCTION

Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan had far-reaching implications, sparking European debates about the visit’s necessity. China’s dramatic military response to the visit compelled European capitals to publicly call for de-escalating cross-strait tensions. Though Taiwan is primarily regarded as an American interest, a Taiwan Strait conflict could escalate into a Sino-American war, a geopolitical standoff that Europe cannot ignore.

This project aims to unpack Taiwan’s importance to Europe through the event of Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. More specifically, this project applies discourse analysis to analyse German, French and British discussions of the high-profile event. While official comments on Pelosi’s visit from London, Paris and Berlin were limited and reserved, public discourses displayed in major media outlets were extensive and provided clearer reasoning. This project synthesises both official and public discourses.

OFFICIAL DISCOURSE

Before Pelosi landed in Taiwan, Berlin made headlines in its warning of potential Chinese reactions. With Russia’s recent invasion of Ukraine in mind, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock stated, “We do not accept it when international law is broken, and a larger neighbour attacks its smaller neighbour in violation of international law, and, of course, that also applies to China.”

After Pelosi left and China announced unprecedented exercises, the G7 issued a joint statement claiming that “There is no justification to use a visit as a pretext for aggressive military activity in the Taiwan Strait. It is normal and routine for legislators from our countries to travel internationally.” The statement also reaffirmed that their One China policies and basic positions on Taiwan had not changed.

Official responses from the examined three states trod a fine line. They hoped to defend Pelosi’s visit without upsetting relations with China by avoiding a clear stance on Taiwan’s controversial status, which they have achieved with their respective One China policies. Though Pelosi’s stated intention for her visit was to stand up for Taiwan, the three European capitals avoided commenting on whether they agreed with Pelosi’s purpose. Instead, they focused on justifying the actions of legislators visiting Taiwan and condemning Chinese reactions. This gap leads to questions relating to whether the three countries saw merit in Pelosi supporting Taiwan with her visit and their main concerns regarding Taiwan.

PUBLIC DISCOURSE

In addition to reporting Pelosi’s visit and the subsequent military crisis in real-time, media from the three European states spilt much ink on how tensions across the Taiwan Strait could affect their economies. Highlighting numerous investment funds invested in TSMC, Taiwan’s major semiconductor manufacturer, the Times published an article titled “How the clash over Taiwan could harm your pension.”

Two state-specific themes stood out among the array of commentaries.

A segment of French opposition to Pelosi’s visit centred on preserving France’s strategic autonomy and questioning American global leadership. For instance, left-wing politician Jean-Luc Mélenchon sparked controversy by calling Pelosi’s trip a “provocation.” Rejecting a Cold War with China and France stuck in a US-led bloc, Mélenchon criticised the French government for giving up “playing a global role” and suggested that “non-alignment” was the better way forward. Mélenchon’s remarks were broadly criticised but reflected French scepticism of Washington’s role in cross-strait dynamics.

Germany stood out in its comparisons of Ukraine and Taiwan when commenting on Pelosi’s visit. The visit became an opportunity to reflect on Germany’s past approach of “change through trade” with Russia and its China strategy. The approach assumed that as Russia’s economy became more intertwined with Europe, Russia would not risk these profitable connections by upsetting the status quo. The Ukrainian War and the Taiwan Strait Crisis were a “wake-up call” for Berlin. Reinhard Bütikofer, a German politician, wrote in Die Welt that the key question behind German discussions of Pelosi’s visit was, “Do we also see a responsibility to show solidarity with Taiwan, or are we following a distorted idea of realpolitik that is prepared to sacrifice Taiwan’s future on the altar of our economic dependence?”

CONCLUSION

This project found numerous gaps between legislators and executives, economic calculations and political assessments, and words and actions.

Pelosi’s Taiwan visit sparked what the Guardian called a “Pelosi effect”: worldwide delegations visiting Taiwan against Beijing’s opposition. British, German and French lawmakers were also affected. Though legislators and part of the public discourse focused on safeguarding Taiwan’s democratic existence, Taiwan’s importance to French, German and British executives in government remains mainly economic. European capitals may be more focused on risk-proofing themselves from the economic disruptions of a Taiwan Strait conflict than defending Taiwan. Though Berlin, London and Paris have been more vocal in expressing concerns for the “peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait,” it remains unclear how their economically-laden perspective of Taiwan and China could translate into solutions for highly political and security-related cross-strait tensions.

The gap between strategic calculations and action was also noticeable in Germany’s business-as-usual approach with China after August 2022. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz visited China in November 2022, becoming the first European leader to visit China after Xi Jinping gained a third presidential term. Whether Europe would support Taipei if a Taiwan Strait war happened was further questioned when French President Emmanuel Macron claimed that Europe risks being “caught up in crises that are not ours.” Macron’s bluntness revealed Europe’s uncertainty about its role in a potential Taiwan Strait contingency.

There is room for criticism of Pelosi’s visit or Washington’s cross-strait approach, but the more Europe understands the costs of a Taiwan Strait conflict to them, the more they will understand that a coherent strategy is needed towards Taiwan.